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Whose voice gets heard? 
Shareholder Value vs. Stakeholder Value in International Modern Public Corporations 
Abstract 
This paper examines the shareholder value orientation of modern public corporations and ar-
gues that employees as well as shareholders need voice. As firms increasingly operate on a 
worldwide basis, they tend to play out different locations against each other leading to an im-
balance in the role of different stakeholder groups. Well-established co-determination mecha-
nisms in countries like Germany are challenged by the threat of relocation of corporate activi-
ties to other countries and work relationships are changing from long-term to short-term per-
spectives. The aim of this paper is to analyse internationally operating modern public corpora-
tions from an agency theory point of view with the focus on the role of shareholders, manag-
ers and employees. The economic reasoning shows that the employees’ voice from a strategic 
perspective should be listened to also in institutional environments that do not force firms to 
do so. 
 
Keywords: Shareholder, Stakeholder, Internationalisation, Employee Rights, Agency Theory 
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1 INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONALISATION AND STAKEHOLDER 
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 
Internationalisation and globalisation need to be taken into account when contemplating mod-
ern business relations (e.g., Jones, 2005). Employee career and employment structure has 
changed while most Western countries have experienced a decline in traditional blue collar 
jobs over the last two decades. Concomitantly, the membership of trade unions has declined 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2004). However, higher skilled knowledge workers also face the pros-
pects of relocation with the possibility of job loss, e.g. Fujitsu established an IT service centre 
in Bangalore and IBM India acts as a major outsourcing partner for other firms helping them 
with relocating activities to India.* This is an interesting development since blue collar work-
ers have been much better represented traditionally by unions than knowledge workers. 
Knowledge workers are those who have been argued to contribute to the realisation of much 
of the competitive advantage of firms today. Drucker (2001:8) goes as far as to postulate “ [..] 
that knowledge workers collectively own the means of production.”  
 
Sophisticated communication, transportation, and computing technologies create within firms 
multifaceted organisational relations and consequently both shareholder and stakeholder rela-
tions become more complex. The paper analyses the question of whether employees as a 
stakeholder group are to be taken into consideration from an economic perspective or if a pure 
shareholder orientation is sufficient. This research question reflects the importance the share-
holder perspective has recently gained in practice as well as in research (e.g., Deakin, 2005). 
 
                                                 
*  See http://www.channeltimes.com/channeltimes/jsp/article.jsp?article_id=69834&cat_id=741 and 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/in/accessed 23-02-06. 
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Long-term employment being the norm in countries like Germany has transformed to rela-
tively short-term employment. Employee responses include less loyalty and trust as well as a 
preference to dedicate human capital to general tasks that are not firm-specific to ensure the 
mobility of their skills in an increasingly insecure workplace (e.g., Pfeffer, 2005a and 2005b; 
Galunic & Anderson, 2000). The Anglo-Saxon countries such as the U.S and Australia belong 
to the countries with the lowest fraction of employees with more than ten years of tenure in a 
firm. The longest tenures can still be observed in Japan with an average tenure of 11.3 years, 
while Germany takes an average position in Europe with 9.7 years of average tenure. Austra-
lia in comparison has an average tenure of 6.4 years (OECD, 1997). 
 
The tendency towards shorter term tenures in a firm is confirmed by research on psychologi-
cal contracts. Psychological contracts include the implicit arrangements about what employers 
and employees can expect from each other and about their respective obligations (Rousseau & 
Schalk, 2000; Tyson & York, 2000). Rousseau (1990) has identified two types of psychologi-
cal contracts that differ significantly from each other: the relational and the transactional con-
tract. The relational contract regards the exchange of job security for loyalty and is character-
ized by rather traditional career expectations implying a vertical career track within one com-
pany. The transactional contract is based on an exchange between employability and flexibil-
ity. Employees holding this type of contract focus on personal skill development because they 
want to increase their attractiveness on the external labour market.  
 
Current employer-employee relations can be characterized by a shift from a relational contract 
to a transactional contract (Mirvis & Hall, 1996). In the U.S. this trend emerged over the past 
decades. The relationship between employers and employees here become more distant, trans-
actional and has largely been coordinated via the market (Cappelli, 1999). Since firms in 
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Western Europe as well as in Japan are oriented more and more towards ‘the American way’ 
of generating competitive advantages a similar development towards more distant and trans-
actional employment relations in these countries has emerged (Pfeffer, 2005b). Rosenbaum 
and Miller call this development ‘the end of the company man’. While the company man 
moved up the company ladder, the new generation of employees is mobile and climbs the 
ladders they can access (Rosenbaum & Miller, 1996; Nicholson, 1996; Rousseau, 1990) and 
can be seen as a ‘free agent’ (Pfeffer, 2005b). Thus, firms lose one of their most valuable and 
distinguishing resources - firm-specific human capital. These problems emerged in the 1980s 
when downsizing, restructuring and outsourcing cost many jobs in Western countries.  
 
Employment security has substantially decreased since then. These developments in job mar-
kets led Shleifer and Summers (1988) to suggest the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis. In psycho-
logical contract research, the term used is the ‘violated psychological contract’ (Robinson & 
Rousseau, 1994). Employers broke implicit contracts with employees who had been willing to 
invest in firm-specific human capital. Firm-specific qualifications were considered less valu-
able on the external than the firm-internal labour market. Thus, employees were only willing 
to invest in such skills and capabilities if their investment was rewarded, e.g. in the form of 
job security (Child & Rodrigues, 2004).  
 
An increasingly neo-liberal thinking framework gave way to greater orientation towards the 
external principals, i.e. the shareholders, thereby neglecting the relationship towards the em-
ployees (Child & Rodrigues, 2004). However, valuable resources and capabilities lie inside 
the firm (e.g. Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993 and Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Dis-
tinct human resources in this context are seen as very valuable for gaining competitive advan-
tages (e.g. Cappelli & Crocker-Hefter, 1996). Even in the traditionally stakeholder-oriented 
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German labour market a more shareholder-oriented thinking framework has emerged. Flexi-
bility is regarded as the solution for the stagnation of the employment market however, the 
consequences of greater flexibility are usually not job creation but rather a streamlining of 
firms through workforce downsizing often in the name of shareholder value creation. 
 
The relevant issue is whether these new flexibility measures genuinely lead to firm success. 
Porter (1996) poses the question of whether this is really strategy or whether it is aimed 
merely at operational effectiveness in an increasingly competitive market where increased 
numbers of competitors seek to gain a share of a relatively static market. Such a situation 
would (in the long run) be neither advantageous for the employees nor the shareholders (at 
least for those who are investors and not speculators). Only those firms that are able to estab-
lish the reputation of being fair employers in the long-run will have access to the most tal-
ented people and also can convince employees (on all levels) to build firm-specific human 
capital (Cappelli, 1999; Child & Rodrigues, 2004). Research has shown that the efficient or-
ganization of firm-specific human capital requires long-term employment relationships, which 
have been suggested by Williamson (1984) using the term of the ‘relational team’ for this 
type of internal labour market being characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Such long-
term relationships may be more beneficial to different types of firms under different circum-
stances and to varying degrees.  
 
Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter (1996) suggest that firms that want to realise first mover advan-
tages by attacking new markets or by responding quickly to changing preferences of custom-
ers need to be flexible. They typically gain this flexibility by not developing competencies of 
employees within the firm but by taking these competencies from the external labour market 
and strongly rely on individual performance. On the other hand side there are firms that main-
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tain stable market niches. These players rely on developing firm-specific human capital to 
gain and sustain competitive advantage. This aspect bears relevance for the chain of argu-
ments presented here by embedding it into a certain firm and market context. At all times 
there have been employers that cared more about their employees and had a closer relation-
ship withthem than others and reasons for that may lie in the different strategic orientations of 
these firms as outlined above. However, what is concerning today is that an overall trend can 
be observed for less closeness and less caring of employers for their employees not only in the 
U.S. but also in Western Europe and Japan and over various industries, including knowledge 
industries, with the consequence that job satisfaction, employee engagement as well as trust in 
management are declining (Pfeffer, 2005b).  
 
2 PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS AS RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholders are “[…] persons or groups with legitimate interest in procedure and/or substan-
tive aspects of corporate activity” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 67). Stakeholders that may be 
taken into account can be employees, customers, suppliers and creditors as well as groups 
with a non-economic relationship to the firm such as environmentalists (Culpan & Trussel, 
2005). In this paper the focus however lies on employees as one relevant stakeholder group. 
Some authors see ethical reasons as the essence of the responsibility of firms towards em-
ployees (e.g., Cuplan & Trussel, 2005; Shankman 1999). We want to add an economic rea-
soning for this responsibility and discuss strategic consequences.  
 
Principal agent theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976) sets its focus on the contracted rela-
tionship between principals and agents. In the case of international public corporations there 
is a variety of different principal agent relationships to be analysed. Representative of these 
are the relationship between the shareholders (principals) and the management (agents) as 
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well as the relationship between the management (principals) and the employees (agents). It is 
argued that the “[…] underlying mechanism with which this relationship is articulated is in 
terms of a contract between the principal and the agent; thus, the firm is seen as a nexus of 
contracts between principals and agents” (Shankman, 1999:320). Agency theory postulates 
that information asymmetry leads to situations of opportunistic agent behaviour. In the analy-
ses of the relationships between shareholders (principals), managers (agents as well as princi-
pals) and employees (agents) often the impression is created that only managers or employees 
(as agents) potentially behave opportunistically. We argue that opportunistic behaviour is not 
necessarily limited to these actors. Shareholders also may act opportunistically, thereby harm-
ing the firm, other shareholders as well as managers and employees.  
 
Agency theory usually casts the principal as the ‘good guy’ while agents are (at least poten-
tially) ‘bad guys’. Thus a need may arise to prevent the possibility of opportunistic agent be-
haviour by managers such as consumption on the job, empire building and uneconomic diver-
sifications. In a shareholder-oriented framework the shareholder is seen as the owner and 
therefore the objective is maximising the shareholder (owner) value with little regard to the 
impact on other stakeholders. However, owners not only have rights but also obligations and 
shareholders differ from traditional owners in terms of having no reserve liability and are re-
moved from both direct involvement and attachment to the organisations they own. Direct 
involvement in running of a company is interceded by management while the method of pur-
chasing most shares through an open share market intermediary creates even further remote-
ness between shareholder and company.  
 
The general obligations of owners should be taken into account in the field of corporate gov-
ernance to also include shareholder responsibilities on the agenda along with those of man-
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agement (Warren, 2002: 14) and other employees. Warren (2002) illustrates this by examin-
ing the asbestos crisis and the firm, Turner and Newall. He outlines that for many years not 
only managers but also shareholders clearly knew more about the consequences of asbestos 
use than they admitted, yet both failed to act to protect employees. In a similar case in Austra-
lia it was found that James Hardie Industries may have sought to protect itself from nearly 
A$2 billion of asbestosis victims’ claims through creating subsidiaries and moving its major 
assets and operations off-shore – an action not substantially opposed by shareholders anxious 
to protect their capital investment. The actions of interested employee groups and unions ul-
timately achieved compensation for victims. In the cases of both Turner and Newall and 
James Hardie, it became obvious how difficult it is in a public corporation to hold sharehold-
ers responsible for such consequences. Many shareholders only invest in the firm for a certain 
time period and many have only a minor stake and therefore may not feel morally responsible.  
 
The implications of shareholders protected by limitations to their financial liability that are 
applicable to investors in public companies also have to be considered. Shareholders may also 
be implicated in the highlighted agency problem as they can argue that management had not 
provided all relevant information and that management was better informed than the share-
holders as they work in the business on a day-by-day basis. If shareholders in public compa-
nies do not assume the duties as well as the rights of owners then they can only partly be con-
sidered as owners.  
 
When putting forward the argument that the relevant purpose of firms lies in maximising 
shareholder value by selling products and therefore other stakeholders should stay in the 
background (e.g., Sternberg, 1992), economic counter-arguments can be given. It is not only 
the ethical perspective that favours integrating other stakeholders. In the liberal framework a 
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firm has the purpose to maximise its value for the owners, i.e. the shareholders. This leads to 
the following: “The shareholders are [..] entitled to hold the company to account. Employees 
are accountable to the company. The shareholders are not, however, accountable to the com-
pany nor to its employees.” (Warren, 2002: 15). Further, as outlined before, shareholders are a 
diverse group that in relevant aspects is different from what traditionally is understood as an 
owner. 
 
Some shareholders adopt a long-term investment position and have a long-term view with 
regard to the firm’s success. However, there are also speculators interested in short-term prof-
its. In contrast, private firm owners are forced to adopt a longer-term perspective. The reason 
for these problems is the high level of goodwill tied up in the idiosyncratic experience and 
knowledge of owner-operators in successful private businesses. These relevant resources can 
usually only be acquired in a learning-by-doing process and are hard to be evaluated from 
outside thus making the exit option difficult (Royer et al. 2006).  
 
The more it can be spoken of controlling investors the more we come back to the shareholder 
in the traditional sense of the owner in terms of their influence on decisions. However, this 
interpretation only takes one side of the equation into consideration. With shareholders that 
hold a dominant share in a firm the mentioned agency problems between shareholders and 
management decrease since such shareholders are highly motivated to effectively control 
management. On the other hand these shareholders can much more easily make use of their 
exit option than an owner of a family business. Exercising their exit option when their holding 
is large consequently leads to a decline in share price that is ultimately harmful to the welfare 
of the firm. However, shareholders at least have a market where shares can be voluntarily 
traded until firm insolvency. The voluntary aspect is removed for employees who have in-
 11
vested in firm specific knowledge capital and whose jobs may be at risk through no influence 
of their own. 
 
Regarding the different kinds of shareholders, Charkham and Simpson (1999) suggest that it 
should be differentiated regarding the obligations of these different groups by making an 
analogy to tax systems where those who earn more have to pay more taxes. Family business 
owners are usually as dependent on the success of their firm as the employees as bearers of 
firm-specific human capital. In this situation the argument that the businesses’ purpose lies in 
maximising the long-term value for the owners makes sense and leaves room for responsibil-
ity of the owners towards other stakeholders, especially the employees. Shareholders are far 
from being owners in the traditional sense.  
 
Looking at firms in business it becomes clear that their performance depends on different in-
put suppliers that contribute different assets to create complex resource bundles that should 
form the basis of (sustainable) competitive advantage (Grant, 1991). The total outcome of the 
firm activities, however, cannot be exactly known in that it is not possible to grant every input 
supplier a certain reward for the effort. At least one of the actors has to accept the residual as 
reward. The residual is the risk that cannot be contractually covered. Shareholders are those 
that primarily deal with the residual risk. Those who bear the residual risk quasi insure the 
other stakeholders against economic risks resulting from incomplete information as well as 
incomplete contracts. In public corporations this risk often is shared by many shareholders 
who own small portions of the total share capital. 
 
From this perspective the relationship between the shareholders and the internal stakeholders 
can be seen as a relationship between insurer and insured (Picot et al., 2005). Insurers need to 
 12
establish mechanisms to protect themselves against those who are insured and who may try to 
opportunistically exploit the insurance company by committing insurance fraud. However, 
insurers may also behave opportunistically in a way that maximises profit through preventing 
the insured from receiving their legitimate entitlements. Thus in most countries insurance 
control is in place to prevent opportunistic behaviour of the insurers. When interpreting the 
relationship between shareholders and internal stakeholders as an insurance relationship some 
sort of insurance control becomes necessary (Picot et al., 2005). 
 
Payment reductions, shortening of social benefits or lay-offs often stem from reasons unre-
lated to the efforts of the employees. They may reflect strategies to opportunistically exploit a 
firm by the insurers (i.e. the shareholders). Thus, not only shareholders need protection 
against managers and other input suppliers, who have incentives to commit insurance fraud by 
claiming that bad performance was due to accident or random events. At the same time man-
agers and other suppliers need protection against shareholders (i.e. the insurers) who have 
incentives to ex post try to not fulfil their insurance function (Blair, 1995 and 1996).  
 
Blair (1995 and 1996) shows that other parties can also make investments in a public corpora-
tion that are similarly under risk as share capital: Employees invest in specific human capital 
such as skills, capabilities, routines and personal relationships that are specifically dedicated 
to the firm. The longer an employee is with a company the higher is his or her amount of 
firm-specific knowledge and this knowledge contributes to the added value of a firm gener-
ated through productive activities (Blair1996). In return, employees receive their share of the 
value added in the form of higher payments (i.e. a compensation for their investment in firm-
specific human capital).  
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Shareholders only appear to be the sole bearers of residual risk because salaries and wages are 
deducted in the balance sheet before profits are established. Employees also can be regarded 
as residual risk bearers. This becomes obvious when firms are in an economic crisis. In such 
situations claims for payments from employees are treated very differently from claims of for 
example, secured creditors that can be contractually and legally accomplished. In times of 
economic crisis employees are often willing to sacrifice parts of their wages as well as other 
benefits to not lose their jobs (and specific investments), yet run a greater risk of never receiv-
ing compensation in the event of corporate collapse. For example, the collapse of Ansett Air-
lines in Australia can be cited here, where for some time employees did not receive their sal-
ary and superannuation entitlements until a ‘rescue package’ was provided by the Australian 
government. Contracts that protect specific investments of employees are therefore incom-
plete.  
 
Following this line of argument, salary increases of employees are in direct competition with 
profit increases for shareholders. Employees are not able to protect their organisational-
specific investments in human capital by exit or retreat. Therefore employees need voice. 
Only if they are able to achieve a voice will they, in the long-term, be prepared to act as inves-
tors in human capital (see Hirschman, 1970, with regard to the general exit-voice problem; 
see e.g. Luchak, 2003 for further analyses of Hirschman’s framework). Shareholders exactly 
for these reasons have both voice as well as an exit option (even though the latter may involve 
the partial loss of invested capital). Furthermore shareholders are generally compensated to 
some degree for their losses through the taxation system. Thus, corporate governance systems 
should consider a fairer distribution of reward between human capitalists and share capitalists 
for the value-adding each generates. Not all interest groups from society can be given a say in 
the business activities of public corporations. Only those who bear residual rights and cannot 
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protect their specific investment by exiting the relationship are from an economic viewpoint 
eligible to obtain voice. The objective should be to create a balanced power constellation be-
tween protection-less groups that fulfil these criteria (Picot et al., 2005; Warren, 2002). 
 
3 RETHINKING AGENCY RELATIONS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF GLOBALLY OPERATING FIRMS 
There is a need to reassess the complex agency relationship between shareholders, managers 
and employees. Shareholders are usually conceptualised as owners but rather act as insurers. 
Shareholders are principals with regard to the management of the firm. There is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that managers as agents may make use of the information asymmetries 
between them and the shareholders and opportunistically act in their own favour (e.g., Bau-
mol, 1959; Williamson, 1963 & 1964). If shareholders are seen as owners, then they should 
share the obligations ownership implies. However, if the only option for shareholders to ef-
fectively protest against firm policy lies in selling the shares, company democracy seems un-
realistic (Warren, 2002). If shareholders are seen as insurers, those who are insured need pro-
tection. If such protection is not in place the insurer may not meet its obligations when 
needed. The insurer also may act opportunistically, by not taking the insured into account and 
not considering other shareholders in the same position.  
 
The employees just as the shareholders invest in the firm by attaching their specific human 
capital to a particular firm. In contrast to shareholders (share capitalists) who usually invest in 
multiple public corporations, employees (human capitalists) invest significant amounts of 
their human assets to one business. These specific investments limit the employee mobility on 
the external labour market. Empirical studies show that employees who have to find a new job 
after a layoff in the external labour market on average lose between 15 and 20 per cent of 
 15
payment as well as the value of benefits that are not transferred from the old to the new work-
place (Osterman, 1999; Topel, 1991). In the strategic management literature usually only sen-
ior managerial employees are seen as critical resources, i.e. the core workforce that has to be 
bound to the firm (Godard & Delaney, 2000). We argue this is a limited view as most em-
ployees remaining in a certain firm for a longer time period accumulate firm-specific relevant 
knowledge (Kullak, 1995). On all levels people become accustomed to the organisational 
structure, know the formal but especially informal communication channels and may develop 
loyalty to their employer.  
 
In summary, it is regarded as important that the complex relationships between the different 
stakeholders are more balanced when firm-specific human capital is regarded as valuable. Not 
only shareholders and managers but also employees need voice to defend their investments in 
specific human capital against devaluation. Since employees are not very concentrated it is 
relevant for this group to organise in some way to gain power compared to that held by other 
stakeholder groups. It is further argued that the traditional principal-agent framework in the 
context of shareholder-manager-employee relations should be adapted. Next to the tradition-
ally focused principal agent relationships between shareholders and managers as well as be-
tween managers and employees, it is argued that shareholders are more similar to insurers 
than to owners. However, there is a need to control these insurers as they may act opportunis-
tically to the detriment of other stakeholders. With regard to the relationship between manag-
ers and owners it has also been outlined that not only employees behave opportunistically, but 
so too do the managers as well as the shareholders. Further, the focus should be less on oppor-
tunistic actors as such and more on the possibilities to create a transaction atmosphere charac-
terised by trust and fairness that prevents opportunism from the start by creating common 
goals for employers and employees as well as shareholders. 
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It can be concluded that long-term employees who invest in firm-specific human capital, are 
investors in the firm and may contribute significantly to value generation. While it has been 
established that shareholders are bearers of residual risk, employees also bear substantial re-
sidual risk by building firm-specific human capital and being vulnerable to corporate collapse 
not associated with their own activities. Employees, therefore, differ from other stakeholders 
such as creditors or suppliers as they invest emotional and human capital in the employer 
company. Therefore, employees can be characterised as hybrid stakeholders, partly residual 
risk bearers and partly input suppliers. 
 
Even though some authors argue that shareholder and stakeholder value orientation in the 
long-run lead to the same results (e.g., Albach, 2001) it seems that the short-time orientation 
on maximising shareholder value is able to harm employee interests to a relevant degree. To 
optimise shareholder value, firms have employed a number of strategies to ensure their com-
petitiveness and profitability in the global environment. Strategies have included the expan-
sion of operations into the international arena and establishing strong links with global firms 
through those firm’s supply chains (Waterhouse et al., 2004). Both these strategies have inevi-
tably resulted in changes to the employment relationship. The recent documentary “Is Wal-
Mart Good for America?” highlighted the effect that international competitiveness has, not 
just on the firm choosing to expand globally, but on those firms in the supply chain. Forced to 
compete with cheap imports for Wal-Mart’s business, American manufacturers have them-
selves moved their operations offshore to take advantage of cheaper labour, primarily, in 
China. The result has been major job losses in the United States along with the loss of specific 
human capital on all levels (in different locations). While shareholder value increases, the 
(long-term) outcome is detrimental to other stakeholders, namely, employees. 
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The outlined economic reasoning suggests that all stakeholders bearing parts of the residual 
risk should be given voice as neither chief executives nor senior management are able to have 
a total view of their firms. Not even the best monitoring systems can solve this problem of 
information asymmetry (Child & Rodrigues, 2004). Furthermore, new organisational forms 
and fluid labour markets in the context of global firm activities have decreased the opportuni-
ties for employee monitoring by management. Employees with ‘voice’ can contribute to the 
reduction of the information asymmetry on the national and international level.  
 
Internationalising firms enter new terrain where they are not forced into country-specific insti-
tutional contexts of work relations but can choose the location(s) with the lowest level of em-
ployee rights (no voice for the employees in the extreme case). A top management measured 
by short-term financial performance of firm activities has a motivation to do exactly this. In 
the pre-globalisation era firms rather had to act in a given country context. Now they can 
choose this context actively with the consequence that the basis for a long-term balance be-
tween employees (human capitalists) as one relevant stakeholder group and share capitalists 
as well as top management (human capitalists) changes massively.  
 
In an environment of a decline in loyalty on the part of both management and employees, the 
principal-agent relationship between these stakeholders becomes more tenuous. The opportu-
nity to achieve voice, particularly for employees, is diminished due to shorter term employ-
ment relationships and increased job insecurity. Investment of human capital by individual 
employees may diminish under these circumstances, while simultaneously the moral obliga-
tions of management to their employees may decline. The result may be less than optimal 
outcomes for shareholders as their management agents lose the ability to attract and retain the 
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organisation’s main competitive advantage. Recent corporate collapses (e.g. Enron in the 
United States and One-Tel and Ansett in Australia) continue to demonstrate the vulnerability 
of employees in their agency arrangements and the need for voice.  
 
In many industrialised countries such as Germany different institutions supported a work en-
vironment in which the voice of the human capitalists has to be taken into account (work 
councils, co-determination legislation). These institutions usually have not developed on be-
half of the firms. However, the following chain of arguments can be built: When exploring 
the German work council construct it is significant to note that the single business has no ini-
tial incentive to implement a work council as it makes employment relations more compli-
cated and does usually not lead to short-term increases in performance. However, when forced 
to install a work council, in the long run performance increases can be observed since a pro-
tected work environment has positive impact on the motivation of the workforce (Waterhouse 
et al., 2004). Dilger (2003) shows empirical evidence that German work councils can be re-
garded as efficient since they are valuable for employees and do not harm employer interests 
as long as these actively cooperate. For the Japanese context Okazaki (2006) shows evidence 
that ‘sanpo’ has a positive impact on efficiency and acts as an institution that prevents labour 
disputes. In Japan ‘sanpo’ (sangyo hukokukai) was introduced to build an organisation where 
employers and employees within the firm meet and communicate in order to moderate labour 
relations. Pfeffer (2005b) suggests that close relations between employers and employees 
(“communal-like relations”) presumably lead to a higher motivation of employees and in-
creased organisational performance. 
 
Management uses work councils as a communication channel to the employees that estab-
lishes a flow of information top-down and bottom-up. This constant (“forced”) flow of infor-
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mation, gives workers a very good picture of their firm’s situation. Consequently, workers do 
not automatically question all management claims but are able to differentiate. Thus, the work 
council structure leads to less aggressive behaviour of workers in times of economic down-
turn, leading to an increase in flexibility advantageous for both parties. Furthermore, because 
the stakeholders are forced to consult with each other a platform of sharing knowledge about 
the firm can result. Finally, the right to participate with regard to firm decisions leads to more 
security for the human capitalists, resulting in a longer-run perspective on the employees’ side 
(for an overview of these impacts see e.g., Addison et al., 2001, Waterhouse et al., 2004). 
 
The implications of institutions formed to represent employees’ interests may well have a 
positive impact in the long run for the employers. As long as firms are “forced to their luck” 
this system works. However, with increasing globalisation and corporate internationalisation, 
firms can choose between different locations with different legislation and workplace institu-
tions. If now they can prevent to be “forced to their luck” by leaving certain countries and 
trying to create a competition between the employees in different locations they may lose a 
valuable resource in the longer term. By bringing more location options for firms into the 
game the voice of employees is less important. Cost savings are possible in the short term 
however losing competitive advantage may be the long-term effect. 
 
It has to be discussed for which firms in which contexts the above chain of arguments is espe-
cially relevant. In this context it may be helpful to differentiate between rather stable and very 
dynamic markets and between firms with different strategic directions. Bingley and Wester-
gaard-Nielsen (2003) suggest that more tenure-heterogeneity between firms may be an indica-
tor for a split up of the labour market into one part with the need for firm-specific human 
capital to realise sustainable competitive advantage and another part that relies on flexibility 
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and therefore cannot afford long-term contracts with employees. Thus it may be relevant to 
distinguish between different environments in which firms compete. As suggested from a dy-
namic capabilities perspective it can be differentiated between moderately dynamic and very 
dynamic (or high velocity) markets (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2001). While Eisenhardt and Mar-
tin (2001) characterise moderately dynamic markets by a stable industry structure, defined 
boundaries, clear business models and identifiable players as well as linear and predictable 
change, they see an ambiguous industry structure, blurred boundaries, fluid business models, 
ambiguous and shifting players as well as nonlinear and unpredictable change in high velocity 
markets. 
 
While in rather stable markets firm-specific human capital seems to play a dominant role this 
is less the case in very dynamic markets. Henderson, Miller and Hambrick (2006) for example 
find that firm-level performance improved steadily in stable markets such as the branded food 
industry with the tenure of CEOs. For dynamic markets such as the computer industry they 
however came to the conclusion that CEOs were best when they first started their jobs and 
that firm performance declined steadily across their tenure. 
 
From this reasoning it may be concluded that there are relevant firm contexts that ask for the 
establishment of firm-specific human capital more than others. Firm-specific human capital 
for these actors plays the central role regarding the generation of sustainable competitive ad-
vantage. Especially for these firms a short-sighted shareholder value orientation is dangerous. 
To secure success in the long-run these organisations have to bind the human resources to the 
firm and motivate employees to invest in firm-specific human capital. These organisations 
presumably benefit a lot from giving voice to the employees. Figure 1 summarises the sug-
gested relations between the relevant actors. 
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---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here------------------------------------------ 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that employees as well as shareholders need voice. A core strength of 
successful companies in many environments lies in firm-specific human capital. Firms build-
ing on this strength by committing to their employees in the long-run traditionally formed one 
of the backbones of the German economy. The increasing focus on a pure shareholder value 
approach drives firms to risk losing this strength, which we argue, in the long-run is not some-
thing shareholders in the sense of long-term investors will profit from.  
 
As more firms operate on a worldwide basis and use different locations against each other the 
former balanced situations became imbalanced. Well-established co-determination mecha-
nisms in countries like Germany are challenged by the realistic threat of relocation of corpo-
rate activities. The consequences of this are twofold: (1) Firms actually relocate parts to other 
countries (where employees have less voice), making those employees with voice redundant; 
and (2) the balance inside a country is challenged since firms are able to hold up against em-
ployees that they will relocate as soon as the employees raise their voice in a way not congru-
ent with a firm’s (short-term-oriented) view leading to a situation with employees with no 
voice as well. Both consequences have negative impact on employees already in the short run. 
However, our reasoning suggests that they are also negative for the competitive strength of 
the firms in the medium to long run. 
 
Building on the results of this paper, the next step should be an intense case study analysis of 
how successful firms in different industry environments integrate their workforce in the reali-
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sation of competitive advantage. Table 1 gives an introductory overview of German public 
corporation that are to be further analysed with regard to this objective. The table is structured 
along four of the six dimensions that Jeffrey Pfeffer (2005b) uses to characterise the degree to 
which organisations are communities. 
 
----------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here------------------------------------------ 
 
One further avenue to be researched in this context would be the exploration of cases where 
employees become shareholders in the company through either open market operations or 
staff share schemes (Child & Rodrigues, 2004). However, a double-threat also exists in that 
employees not only invest their human capital but also their financial capital in a public com-
pany over which they may have little control regarding performance.  
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Figure 1: Relations between Shareholders and Stakeholders 
 
 
Sustainable 
Competitive 
Advantage
Shareholders
“Insurers“
“indirectly linked to the 
firm“
invest: financial 
resources
take: residual risk
Other potential 
Stakeholders
“indirect relationship“
e.g. environmentalists, 
unions, society
Market Environment
Stable/dynamic markets
Economic situation 
Degree of Globalisation
Core External Stakeholders
“with direct influence on 
realising competitive 
advantages“
give various inputs (buyers, 
suppliers, creditors)
get: fixed reward
Employees
“Insured“
“directly linked to the firm“
invest: general and firm-
specific human resources 
get: fixed and variable 
reward and part of residual 
risk
Management
“Insured“
“directly linked to the firm“
invest: general and firm-
specific human resources 
get: fixed and variable 
reward and part of residual 
risk
strong impact on competitive advantage realisation
medium impact on competitive advantage realisation
weak impact on competitive advantage realisation
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Table 1: Selected German Firms and Dimensions of Community Organisations 
 
 
Firm 
(Industry) 
Employees 
Benefits and 
Assistance 
Companies Spon-
sored Social 
Events 
Resolving 
Work-Family 
Issues 
Long-term 
Employment 
Weleda AG 
(Cosmetics, 
Pharmaceuticals) 
Qualification pro-
grams 
Diverse activities to 
protect the nature 
Child care, gen-
eration network, 
flexible working 
times (concept of 
trust-based work-
ing time).  
n.a. 
BASF AG 
(Chemical) 
Education and 
qualification pro-
grams; social bene-
fits; pensions; 
individual share of 
firm success; 
health manage-
ment; optional 
share programs 
and heath insur-
ance 
Education initiatives 
for children; various 
cultural and sport 
activities; activities for 
environmental protec-
tion  
Individual part-
time work, child 
care 
n.a. 
Linde AG 
(Gas, Engineer-
ing & Material 
Handling) 
Education and 
qualification pro-
grams; virtual 
‘Linde-
University’; bonus 
system for sug-
gested improve-
ments, innovation 
awards; pension 
insurance; health-
care programs; 
junior circles 
Scholarships and sup-
port for non-German 
students; various local 
activities; activities for 
environmental protec-
tion; support for voca-
tional training and 
education (Carlvon 
Linde Akademie, Carl 
von Linde Foundation, 
Dr. –Friedrich-Linde 
Foundation) 
Improvement of 
family friendli-
ness is fostered; 
idea of work-
balance is ac-
knowledged. 
In 2004 the aver-
age tenure with 
Linde Germany 
was 16.1 years.  
SAP AG  
(Software, IT 
Services) 
Education and 
qualification pro-
grams; awards for 
excellent ideas; 
Stock Appreciation 
Rights-Program 
(STAR), Long-
Term-Incentive-
Plan (LTI), Stock 
Option Program 
(SOP); pension 
and risk insurance; 
healthcare pro-
grams; diverse 
recreation facili-
ties; free lunch for 
all staff 
SAP University Alli-
ances Program; FIRST 
LEGO League Com-
petition; various local 
activities (focus on 
education, innovation 
and governance); SAP 
CUP (Soccer tourna-
ment for employees) 
Childcare (‘SAP 
Babyplace’); 
possibility to 
exchange parts of 
salary for time 
In 2005 the aver-
age tenure with 
SAP AG was 5 
years. 
Source: Dimensions adapted from Pfeffer (2005b): 37; web pages of mentioned firms. 
 
